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The Evolution of Securities Laws in Thailand
Jinn-Min (Jimmy) Lin
I.

Introduction
Capital markets play an important role in any modern economy. They serve as a largescale mechanism for the private sector to assimilate funds from dispersed sources of
wealth among the general public. The infusion of capital allows companies to expand
their operations and grow their businesses to unprecedented levels. This increases
profitability, and in turn, accelerates nationwide economic growth. More importantly,
aside from paying dividends or repurchasing shares, the capital will continue to remain in
the companies as equity. This differs from debt financing where the funds are eventually
returned to the investor or financial institution with interest payments. On the flipside,
capital markets also provide private investors with more options to make productive use
of their savings. This gives the general public an opportunity to participate in the
industries and watch their wealth grow along with the economy.
In general, the functioning of capital markets requires a comprehensive and up-todate system of securities regulation. Without effective laws and sanctions in place, fraud
would become rampant and investors would lose faith in the markets. Thus, the primary
goal of securities regulation is to prevent such fraud through adequate disclosure,
establishment of standards, and prevention of abuses. Once the investors are able to
differentiate between trustworthy investments and risky ventures, capital will naturally
flow to the more efficient and productive uses. Another important goal of securities
regulation is to anticipate and prevent systemic risk. Regulators should proactively
address risk factors and impose safeguards against widespread market failure. Finally, as
1

the market progresses over time, securities regulation must also constantly evolve to
address international standards, investment trends, and the constantly-changing risks1.
In emerging markets, capital markets and securities regulation become an integral part
of economic growth and national development. Thailand is currently the 26th largest
economy in the world with a gross domestic product of 438 billion USD2. The capital
markets in Thailand have steadily expanded since the 1960s, channeling domestic funds
and foreign investment into Thai industry and commerce. At the same time, securities
regulation in Thailand has constantly evolved in response to market demands and the
widespread risks stemming from domestic and international financial crises. These
changes have focused on investor protection, prevention of systemic risk, and
conformity to international standards. Faced with internal pressures and foreign
influences, Thai regulators must constantly innovate to keep up with the constantlychanging market conditions.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section two briefly reviews the history
of securities regulation in Thailand and summarizes the recent amendments to the
Securities and Exchange Act B.E. 2535. Section three analyzes the current challenges and
obstacles for securities regulation in Thailand. Section four presents different approaches
to addressing the problems faced by Thai regulators and discusses countervailing views.
Section five concludes and comments on the future of securities regulation in Thailand.
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See generally Zahar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L. J. 711
(2006).
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World GDP Ranking 2017, Knoema, available at: https://knoema.com/nwnfkne/world-gdp-ranking-2017-gdp-bycountry-data-and-charts
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II.

History of Securities Regulation in Thailand
Under the guidance of foreign advisors, Thai securities laws have made remarkable
progress over the past 60 years. The Thai system has been mainly based on the foreign
models with a central regulatory agency sharing regulatory responsibility with a dominant
stock exchange. In addition, the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and Global Financial
Crisis of 2007 have also acted as catalysts for the improvement of securities regulation in
Thailand. This section summarizes the important changes in Thai securities laws during
this period and notes their aggregate effect on the Thai capital markets.

a. Pre-SEC Regulatory Framework (1963 – 1992)
The roots of modern securities trading in Thailand can be traced back to the
founding of the Bangkok Stock Exchange in 19633. It was first established as a
limited partnership, but transitioned to a limited company in 1963, adopting the
name, Bangkok Stock Exchange Co., Ltd. (the BSE)4. However, the BSE lacked
official government support, and investors on the whole did not have an adequate
understanding of the nature of stock markets. Thus, the BSE had low trading
volume and eventually closed down in the early 1970s5.
After the failure of the BSE, the Thai Government worked with foreign advisors
and the Bank of Thailand to establish a new stock exchange as a quasi-governmental
agency. In 1974, the Thai Government passed the Stock Exchange of Thailand Act
B.E. 2517 (the ’74 Act), which created the Securities Exchange of Thailand (the
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History & Roles, Stock Exchange of Thailand Website, available at:
https://www.set.or.th/en/about/overview/history_p1.html (last accessed on April 20, 2018).
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Id.
5
Id.
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SET)6. Subsequently, the Thai Revenue Code was updated and trading officially
began on April 30, 1975. In the beginning, trading experienced slow growth and low
volumes similar to the predecessor, the BSE. Around 1987, the SET began to
mobilize funds from private and corporate savings augmented by international
investment on the SET7. Thailand attracted foreign capital by liberalizing the
financial sector, maintaining high domestic interest rates, and pegging their currency
to the US dollar8. These measures had a noticeable effect and the SET experienced
continued growth during this period. In addition, the SET was also the primary
regulator of securities markets until the creation of the Thai SEC in 1992 (discussed
below).

b. SEC Establishment and Early Years (1992 - 1997)
The Securities and Exchange Act B.E. 25359 (the '92 Act) delegated securities
regulation responsibility to the newly-created Thai Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and tasked it with overseeing securities offerings, initial public
offerings, investment companies, takeovers and tender offers in addition to
preventing market manipulation and insider trading 10. The SET, now renamed the
“Stock Exchange of Thailand”, instead become the main regulator of the secondary
market for the trading of already listed securities. Due to the role of American legal
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Id.
Kathryn C. Lavelle, The Politics of Equity Finance in Emerging Markets 136-37 (2004).
8
Id.
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Securities and Exchange Act B.E. 2535 (1992), available at:
http://www.sec.or.th/EN/SECInfo/LawsRegulation/Pages/Act_Royal_Enactment.aspx
10
About the SEC, The Thai Securities and Exchange Commission Website, available at:
http://www.sec.or.th/EN/AboutSEC/Pages/Introduction.aspx#Tabcontent1 (last accessed on April 20, 2018).
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scholars in the planning process, this model was largely based on the then prevailing
US securities laws.
However, it’s worth noting that the Thai securities laws deviated from the US
approach in certain aspects11. First, the listing mechanism for new Thai securities
involved a merit-based approval which differs from the US disclosure model12. The
newly-created Thai SEC would evaluate the new companies and assess potential risks
before approving them to list on the SET and issue stock. Second, the SEC
commission members were directly appointed by various government agencies
which could easily exert their influence on securities policies13. Finally, the Thai SEC
was initially unable to bring civil cases like its US counterpart. Their scope of
enforcement was limited to criminal and administrative sanctions14.
In the years following the creation of the Thai SEC, foreign investors were
attracted by abundant cheap labor in Thailand as well as the growing manufacturing
and construction industries. Now, with an investment framework and new
regulations in place, foreign capital flooded into the Stock Exchange of Thailand15.
From 1992 to 1994, the number of listed companies per million people in Thailand
spiked from 5.45 to 28.7616. Even with a shockingly high average GDP growth rate
of 8.5%, the stock market capitalization to GDP ratio rapidly climbed from 43.12%
to 88.2% during this period17. By 1996, foreign reserves exceeded $32 billion,
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See Pises Sethsathira, Securities Regulation in Thailand: Laws and Policies, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 783 (1995).
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Id.
14
Id.
15
See Chris Baker & Pasuk Phongpaichit, Thailand's Boom and Bust: Revised Edition (1998).
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Number of Listed Companies for Thailand, Fred Economic Data, available at:
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DDOM01THA644NWDB (last accessed on April 22, 2018).
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Stock Market Capitalization to GDP for Thailand, FRED Economic Data, available at:
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DDDM01THA156NWDB (last accessed on April 22, 2018).
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unemployment was at 2%, and inflation was 4.9%18. Overall, favorable conditions for
foreign investment combined with a robust system for securities regulation helped
Thailand skyrocket to become one of the “Asian Tigers” of the era.

c. Asian Financial Crisis and Legal Reform (1997 - 2008)
From 1997 to 1998, Thailand was hit hard by the Asian Financial Crisis.
Increasing competition from China, a slowdown in the construction industry, and a
rapid devaluation of the Thai Baht had created unfavorable conditions for
sustainable economic growth19. Large loans had been extended to large family
businesses with deep connections in the government without adequate assessment of
credit risks20. With a lack of transparency, abuse of minority shareholders, and even
fraudulent accounting practices, multiple businesses found themselves suddenly
unable to fulfill their debt obligations21. Foreign investors and creditors began a rapid
withdrawal of capital, leading to a large-scale implosion of the Thai investment
economy. The effects on the stock market were devastating: the SET Stock Market
Index plummeted from a high of 1385 at the start of 1996 to a record low of 231 in
199822. Securities regulation had failed to protect shareholders from substantial
losses, and the stock market crashed due to investor panic and mistrust23. To make
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Jeffrey Hays, Economic History of Thailand, Post-War Boom and the Thaksin and Post-Thaksin Years (2008).
See Narisa Laplamwanit, A Good Look at the Thai Financial Crisis in 1997-98, Columbia University Report (Fall
1999), available at: http://www.columbia.edu/cu/thai/html/financial97_98.html
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Arthur M. Mitchell & Clare Wee, Corporate Governance in Asia Today and Tomorrow, 38 INT'L L. 1, 3-4 (2004).
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Scott B. MacDonald, Transparency in Thailand's 1997 Economic Crisis: The Significance of Disclosure, 38 Asian
Surv. 688, 689 (1998).
22
Thailand SET Index, Market Watch, available at:
https://www.marketwatch.com/investing/index/set?countrycode=th
23
See Laurids S.Lauridsen, The Financial Crisis in Thailand: Causes, Conduct and Consequences, 26 WORLD DEV. 157591 (1999).
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matters worse, there were no successful prosecutions for securities fraud or insider
trading, and investors had no viable legal recourse to seek compensation.
In response to the crisis, the Thai Government increased taxes, cut public
spending, privatized several state-owned businesses, and raised interest rates24. The
rampant abuses and lack of transparency in the stock market also led to the 1999 and
2003 amendments to the ’92 Act, seeking to conform Thai securities law to what was
deemed to be the international best practices set forth in the Washington
Consensus25. These standards, advocated by the US, the IMF, and the World Bank,
were based on the concept of efficiency in the free market. The approach primarily
involved disciplining corporate management and providing information for investors
to make rational decisions26. This would entail improving the quality of accounting
and disclosure through tighter regulation and better oversight by regulators,
independent company directors and auditors27.
With the amendments to the ’92 Act, the SEC departed from its initial meritbased approval process for new companies wishing to list on the SET. Instead, the
SEC allowed these companies to directly list upon meeting certain disclosure
requirements. They would then be subject to heightened scrutiny regarding the
timeliness and accuracy of their statements28. In 1998 alone, the SEC required 38
listed firms to revise their financial statements, penalized 79 companies for late or
faulty disclosure, and fined 14 securities companies a total of 15.5 million baht29. The

24

Id.
John Fagan, The Role of Securities Regulation in the Development of the Thai Stock Market, 16 COLUM. J. ASIAN L.
303, 312 (2003).
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Shawn W. Crispin & Mark Mitchell, Market Free for All, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV. (June 1, 2000).
29
Matthew Montagu-Pollock, Thai Stock Market Cleans Up Its Act, AsiaMoney (May 2000).
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SEC also required listed companies to form independent audit committees by the
beginning of 2000 to scrutinize company disclosures and accounting procedures
while pushing firms to appoint at least two independent directors to their boards30.
These measures resulted in a slow, but steady recovery, with the SET Index climbing
to 525 in 1999, then dipping down a bit before hitting 753 at the start of 200431.
With securities regulation on the right track, the SEC turned its attention to the
regulation of derivatives, such as futures, options, swaps and other financial
instruments. In 2003, the Derivatives Act B.E. 254632 (the ’03 Act) was promulgated
to increase protection for investors, and it established the Thailand Futures
Exchange (the TFEX) in 2004 under the supervision of the SEC. The goals of the
TFEX are to provide investors, fund managers, financial institutions and the general
public with the necessary tools to manage their portfolios effectively33. In addition to
licensing and registration requirements, the ’03 Act also has provisions about the
reporting, operator shareholding/personnel requirements, operational restrictions,
sales practices, unfair practices, risk management/disclosure, advertisements, client
asset management and protection, financial integrity, audit control, and civil/criminal
sanctions34.

30

Id.
Market Watch, supra note 22.
32
Derivatives Act B.E. 2546, available at:
www.sec.or.th/EN/SECInfo/LawsRegulation/Documents/actandroyal/deri_act_codified_en.pdf
33
See Patcharaporn Pootranon & Nattaya Tantirangsi, Capital Markets Review – Thailand, Weerawong,
Chinnavat & Partners Ltd. Report (2017), available at: www.weerawongcp.com/data/know/72.pdf
34
Dennis Campbell, International Protection of Foreign Investment, Volume II, THA 2-3 (2009).
31
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d. Recent Amendments and Developments (2008 - )
In the last ten years, the Thai Government has continued to improve its securities
laws to address potential risks and perceived problems. The US Subprime Mortgage
Crisis in 2007 had led to a worldwide recession, prompting many governments to
update their securities laws. In the US, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 created a new
oversight council to oversee risk, vamped up disclosure and transparency
requirements for securities, and introduced a whistleblower program to expose
corporate fraud35. The Thai Government was quick to respond to the Global
Financial Crisis of 2007 with “vigorous fiscal pump priming” 36, and their economy
did relatively well with the exception of lowered exports and the withdrawal of some
foreign companies. Nevertheless, the Thai SEC sought to follow the developments
of international best practices and updated the Thai securities laws accordingly.
In 2008, the ’92 Act was amended once again to enhance investor protection and
support effective enforcement of securities laws37. The amendments imposed
stringent fiduciary duties for the directors and management of listed companies,
enabled minority shareholders to bring derivative suits and civil actions, and required
mandatory approval for transactions with related parties38. On the enforcement side,
the securities laws protected whistleblowers and rewarded them with up to 30% of

35

See generally Summary of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Davis Polk Report
(July 21, 2010), available at: http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:h4173enr.txt.pdf
36
Shawn W. Crispin, Eye on Thailand: The Global Financial Crisis, The Green Political Foundation (February 19,
2009), available at: https://www.boell.de/en/navigation/economy-6199.html
37
Yingyong Karnchanapayap, Amendments to the Securities and Exchange Act B.E. 2535 (A.D. 1992), Tilleke and
Gibbins Report (December 2008), available at: http://www.tilleke.com/resources/amendments-securities-andexchange-act-be-2535-ad-1992
38
Id.
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the related fines39. A new Capital Markets Supervisory Board (CMS Board) was
created to assist the SEC in governing day-to-day operational matters such as
securities businesses, securities offerings, and tender offers40. On top of that, new
criteria were established for SEC and CMS Board member selection, adjusting their
composition, individual qualification requirements and terms of office41.
The next set of amendments to the ’92 Act came in 2016. These changes focused
on market misconduct by defining a clearer scope for insider trading and price
manipulation rules42. New civil sanctions and procedures were also provided for
these offenses. This was deemed to be an important improvement to enforcement
mainly because civil suits have a lower burden of proof and lead to a much faster
penalty. Furthermore, the amendments expanded the range of persons who would
fall under insider trading restrictions43. Rather than just those who are employed by
the listed company, anyone who exploits the confidential information for personal
gain as well as those who held and dispersed the inside information could be found
liable44. On top of that, the Thai SEC also issued a notification regarding bans for
individuals found guilty of certain unfair trading offenses from being directors or
executives in issuing or listed companies for 3 years45.
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Id.
Id.
41
Id.
42
National Legislative Assembly Approves New Amendments to Securities Law, SEC News Release No. 86/2016,
available at:
http://www.sec.or.th/en/Pages/News/Detail_News.aspx?tg=NEWS&lg=en&news_no=86&news_yy=2016
43
Sasithorn Ongdee, SEC Given More Legal Power, The Nation (September 17, 2016), available at:
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/news/business/EconomyAndTourism/30295527
44
Id.
45
Theppachol Kosol & Boonyaporn Donnapee, Thai SEC Imposes Immediate Ban on Fined Unfair Trading Directors
and Executives, Baker McKenzie Global Compliance News (September 7, 2016), available at:
https://globalcompliancenews.com/sec-imposes-immediate-ban-fined-unfair-trading-directors-executives20160907/
40
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During this period, the SET index nearly quadrupled, rebounding from the mid400s to a high of 1804 on April 23, 201846. In 2017, the Stock Exchange of Thailand
had a total of 656 listed companies and a market capitalization of 437.4 billion
USD47. While the capital markets in Thailand have definitely come a long way since
their humble beginnings, various systemic and regulatory problems persist in Thai
securities regulation (later discussed). In addition, the future of Thailand’s economy
remains uncertain as crude oil prices fluctuate and a trade war between China and the
US looms in the distance48. The evolution of Thai securities laws is far from
complete, and much room for improvement remains.

III.

Current Challenges for the Thai Securities Market
In the introduction, we discussed how the core aims of securities regulation are
protecting investors, promoting efficient use of capital, and preventing systemic loss.
Within Thailand’s regulatory landscape, these aims are threatened by enforcement
obstacles and weak corporate governance. External factors such as new technologies and
political instability also create unique challenges for Thai regulators. In this section, we
discuss the root causes of these problems and how they affect the development and
utilization of capital markets in Thailand.

46

Market Watch, supra note 22.
Stock Exchange of Thailand, Sustainable Stock Exchanges Initiative Website, available at:
http://www.sseinitiative.org/fact-sheet/set/ (last accessed on April 23, 2018).
48
Win Streak Expected to End for the Thai Stock Market, NASDAQ (April 2, 2018), available at:
https://www.nasdaq.com/article/win-streak-expected-to-end-for-thai-stock-market-20180402-01152
47
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a. Enforcement Obstacles
Despite steady growth in the stock market, actual enforcement under the
amended securities laws have had limited success. Out of the 47 insider trading cases
reported by the Thai SEC from 2009-2015, only eight criminal complaints were filed,
while only two actually went to trial49. The Thai Criminal Court imposed a fine of
1.25 million baht in one case and a jail sentence and fine in the other50. In contrast,
the US SEC filed a total of 754 enforcement actions in 2017 alone51. While the US
SEC manages a far larger and more complicated securities market, this sharp contrast
in enforcement activity reflects the difficulties faced by Thai authorities in
responding to violations of securities laws.
In 2002, the Thai SEC filed an enforcement action against executives of the
Brinton group who engaged in boiler room operations, selling worthless shares of
overseas companies at inflated prices52. Thai prosecutors found evidence that the
Brinton representatives were unqualified to sell securities and give investment advice.
Despite domestic and international pressures, the Thai prosecutors were unable to
meet the high burdens of proof for criminal convictions of these executives. It is
said that there is a “traditional reluctance in Thailand to prosecute elite members of
society, such as business or political leaders, for any crimes whatsoever, let alone a
crime so difficult to prove as securities fraud53.” More recently in 2016, the chairman
of Siam Global House Public Company Limited (GLOBAL) was alleged to be in

49

Cynthia M. Pornavalai, Insider Trading: Time for Reform and Tougher Penalties, Bangkok Post (May 2, 2016),
available at: http://www.tilleke.com/resources/insider-trading-time-reform-and-tougher-penalties
50
Id.
51
Division of Enforcement 2017 Annual Report, US SEC Website, available at: www.sec.gov/files/enforcementannual-report-2017.pdf
52
Conviction on Boiler Room Case—The Brinton Group, Thai SEC Press Release No. 42/2004.
53
Fagan, supra note 25, at 331.
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violation of the insider trading under the ’92 Act54. While criminal convictions are
unlikely to happen, under the new amendments to the ’92 Act, the SEC was
fortunately able to impose administrative fines for those who abused the confidential
information and also ban a perpetrator from assuming executive roles in the financial
sector for three years55.
These difficulties arise from various factors. First of all, similar to the US,
criminal charges must be proven “beyond a reasonable doubt”56. This makes it
almost impossible to establish scienter in securities fraud, insider trading, and market
manipulation cases without any hard evidence. Second, even if there is sufficient
evidence to prove misdealing or securities fraud, public prosecutors, either because
of a lack of experience or a lack of incentive to prosecute the well-connected elites,
eventually drop the cases57. Finally, while the 2016 amendments introduced
administrative fines and other direct sanctions, it is unclear whether they actually
result in effective deterrence. In addition, there is the concern that penalties such as
suspending trading or removal of certain officers might actually harm the
stockholders more than the violators58.

54

Thailand Fines Executives for Insider Trading, Reuters (March 26, 2016), available at:
https://www.reuters.com/article/thailand-insider-trading/thailand-fines-executives-for-insider-tradingidUSL3N16O3WS
55
Id.
56
Fagan, supra note 25, at 327-28.
57
See Nisha Kanchanapoomi, Accelerating Corporate Governance Reform in Thailand: The Benefits of Private
Reform Mechanisms, 15 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 165 (2005).
58
Fagan, supra note 25 at 329-30.
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b. Weak Corporate Governance
Outside of government intervention and enforcement, corporate governance can
also act as an effective mechanism to prevent abuses in the capital markets.
However, in Thailand, dispersed shareholder ownership is uncommon, and the
controlling shareholders tend to operate companies to secure profits for themselves
and other insiders often at the expense of minority shareholders59. These controlling
shareholders typically consist of members from dominant and well-connected
business families in Thailand. While Public Limited Company Act B.E. 253560
contains various shareholder rights, such as shareholders’ meetings, proxy voting,
and election of directors, in the end, the decisions of independent directors and audit
committees are often heavily influenced by these dominant families61.
Under these circumstances, retail investors have little incentive to engage in longterm investment and participate in corporate management. Thai investors are thus
unlikely to take on an activist role to resist abuses of securities laws. Furthermore,
the cost of seeking legal redress for individual investors is prohibitively high, and
mechanisms for overcoming collective action problems are relatively new and
limited. As such, short-term speculation becomes the best way for these investors to
reduce the risk of losing their investment62. Few investors have the incentive to
engage in fundamental analysis of business models and profitability, leading to a

59

See J. Thomas Connelly et al., Corporate Governance, Family Ownership and Executive Compensation: Evidence
from Thailand (2015).
60
Public Limited Company Act B.E. 2535 (1992), available at:
http://www.dbd.go.th/dbdweb_en/ewt_news.php?nid=3932
61
Fagan, supra note 25, at 332.
62
Fagan, supra note 25, at 343.
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general disregard for accurate disclosures and transparency63. This lack of due
diligence results in a vicious cycle as more abuses go undetected and retail investors
have even less incentive to invest in the capital markets64.

c. Emerging Technologies and Political Instability
Technological change presents another unique and formidable challenge for Thai
securities regulators. Cryptocurrencies have rapidly gained popularity among
investors worldwide with securities and tax laws rushing to catch up. Initial coin
offerings (ICOs) closely resemble the issuance of new securities fundraising for a
project65, and governments are now struggling to regulate ICOs to prevent fraud and
protect investors. The US SEC has snared cryptocurrencies under the Howey Test as
an “investment contract” and has constantly been releasing additional guidance on
the matter66. In Thailand, J Ventures recently became the first Thai company to
launch a successful ICO, raising 660 million baht within 55 hours. The Thai
government subsequently put all ICO-related processes on hold before regulations
and enforcement can catch up with the developments67. In March, a draft decree has
just been issued to define cryptocurrencies and digital tokens68, but many questions
remain unanswered. As it may take years for the regulatory authorities to approve

63

Celia R. Taylor, Capital Market Development in the Emerging Markets: Time to Teach an Old Dog Some New
Tricks, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 71 (1997).
64
Nisha, supra note 57.
65
Bitcoin Magazine, What is an ICO?, NASDAQ Website (August 10, 2017), available at:
https://www.nasdaq.com/article/what-is-an-ico-cm830484
66
Michael Del Castillo, A 'Howey Test' for Blockchain? Why the SEC's ICO Guidance Isn't Enough, CoinDesk (August
6, 2017), available at: https://www.coindesk.com/every-token-snowflake-secs-ico-guidance-isnt-enough/
67
Stephen O’Neal, Thailand’s Government Battle With Crypto Enters Decisive Phase, CoinTelegraph (March 21,
2018), available at: https://cointelegraph.com/news/thailands-government-battle-with-crypto-enters-decisivephase
68
Kevin Helms, Thailand Approves Draft Decree on Crypto, Bitcoin News (March 30, 2018), available at:
https://news.bitcoin.com/thailand-approves-draft-decree-crypto/
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such digital asset transactions, progress is impeded and investment opportunities
lost.
Political instability poses yet another external threat for the capital markets of
Thailand. Since 1932, when the absolute monarchy was abolished, Thailand has had
25 general elections and 19 coups d'état, 12 of them successful69. Due to frequency
of these military coups, the markets and currency are accustomed to the transitions
of power and do not experience large fluctuations70. However, with the formation of
each new government, new ministers are appointed and legal reform is initiated to
address alleged corruption issues. During the transition phase, securities enforcement
and various capital markets operations are put on halt. As such, the political
instability constantly affects the effectiveness of securities laws in Thailand and
impedes the progress of new regulation. As securities laws lag behind, foreign capital
flows away to nearby countries and Thai companies may even start considering
cross-listing their shares on foreign exchanges instead71.

IV.

Solutions and Implementation
The unique challenges for Thai securities regulation require tailored solutions, taking
into account the ownership structures of Thai companies, judicial systems, local business
culture, and existing laws. Simply put, we cannot simply transplant the securities laws of
other developed capital markets, hoping to achieve identical results. In this section, we

69

Patrick Brown, Thailand's 19th Coup Underscores Country's Fatal Flaw, CBC (May 30, 2014), available at:
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/thailand-s-19th-coup-underscores-country-s-fatal-flaw-1.2658846
70
Linda Yueh, Thailand Coup: Effect on the Markets, BBC News (May 23, 2014), available at:
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-27537580
71
John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on
International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (2002).
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discuss the recent efforts made by the Thai government in responding to the problems
and threats within their capital markets. We then propose changes and new initiatives to
address these issues, referencing the approaches taken by other countries while also
considering the unique characteristics of the capital markets in Thailand.

a. New Tools for Enforcement
As discussed in the last section, successful enforcement of securities laws is
impeded by the difficulty of criminal convictions, the relative inexperience of Thai
prosecutors, and the ineffectiveness of administrative sanctions. Recent amendments
to the Thai securities laws have provided monetary penalties and suspension of
professional licenses as options for some regulatory enforcement72. These act as far
more effective enforcement tool because they can target a wider range of offenders
and do not require “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” as for criminal charges. Also,
these penalties are less costly to implement and may even result in administrative
revenue in the case of monetary fines. Therefore, the Thai government should make
these penalties available for more types of offenses and also calculate amounts
according to the severity of the offense and the profitability of the company. These
enforcement tools should not replace criminal prosecutions, but instead, be
implemented together with existing sanctions.
However, regulators must abide by certain principles when utilizing these
administrative sanctions73. There should be clear guidance on the use of monetary

72

Administrative Sanction, Thai SEC Website, available at:
http://www.sec.or.th/EN/Enforcement/Pages/AdministrativeSanction.aspx (last accessed on April 24, 2018).
73
See Sakda Thanitcul & Tir Srinopnikom, Monetary Penalties: An Empirical Study on the Enforcement of Thai
Insider Trading Sanctions, Kasetsart Journal of Social Sciences (March 9, 2018), available at:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2452315117301571
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penalties and a clear range of discretion for regulators74. In addition, the regulator
should not receive any benefit from the offender’s payment, and the offender should
be given an adequate opportunity to appeal these sanctions75.
Another way to overcome the hurdles of criminal prosecution for securities
violations is for the SEC itself to initiate civil suits. This has become a possibility
under the recent amendments to the ’92 Act in 201676. Under the new law, the Civil
Sanction Committee will allow the SEC to pursue civil cases for certain types
violations77. Recently in September 2017, the Civil Sanction Committee imposed a
civil sanction of 500,000 baht on a director of Siam Sport Syndicate Public Company
Limited for a securities purchase based on a non-disclosed, material fact. The civil
sanctions work to supplement administrative penalties by targeting certain offenses
that require more proof and due process. To effectively utilize this tool, the
government must clearly define the punishable offenses and hire experts in this field
to track down and pursue claims.
However, like administrative fines, these sanctions generate revenue for the
government but fail to compensate shareholders and parties harmed by the violation.
The leads to our next recommendation on class actions. In 2015, the civil procedures
rules of Thailand were modified to allow class actions for the first time in Thai
history78. In class actions, members of a class are effectively automatically
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represented in the relevant litigation case unless a member exercises their option to
exit the class79. This overcomes collective action problems and the financial
difficulties for individual plaintiffs to seek remedies and compensation. These
mechanism is especially effective for securities violations where a large class of
plaintiffs were harmed, such as in insider trading, securities fraud, and even market
manipulation. In the early years of class action litigation in Thailand, lawyers may be
reluctant to take these cases because they have little precedent to work with. Thai law
should thus incorporate certain features to facilitate this process, such as extending
standing to subsequent holders of securities, stretching statute of limitations, and
allowing higher contingent fees for lawyers taking these cases. Although this may
result in higher insurance premiums for companies exposed to new risks80, this
actually forces the companies to internalize the negative externalities caused by their
riskier operations and mismanagement.

b. Empowering Minority Shareholders
In companies with dispersed ownership, minority shareholders can assume
activist roles to investigate fraudulent activity, report abuses, and even bond together
to steer the company away from potential securities violations. However, these roles
will not take effect if shareholder rights under the Public Limited Company Act are
nullified by unduly influenced independent directors and audit committees.
Empowering these minority shareholders works to reinforce existing securities laws
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and enable them to take on these activist roles81. After all, the primary purpose of
securities regulation is to protect investors, and what better way is there than to give
them to tools to protect themselves?
The easiest way to empower these outside shareholders is to grant them
additional rights to compensate for their relative lack of power. These could include
guaranteeing them extra seats on the board, allowing them to veto certain relatedparty transactions, and giving them higher sums of compensation if oppressed.
However, this may backfire if the minority uses these heightened rights to influence
corporate policy for their own personal gain. A different approach involves
incentivizing institutional investors to purchase minority stakes in companies. These
institutional investors, such as funds or investment banks, are capable of conducting
detailed analyses and exercising shareholder rights to protect their investment82.
Furthermore, they will be more likely to demand enforcement for violations and
protest undue influence in committees83. On the other hand, the companies are also
more willing to cooperate with these institutional investors to utilize their business
connections and professional expertise both domestically and overseas. These new
investors can be brought in through the availability of better enforcement tools
(discussed in the previous subsection), mandatory ownership thresholds, tax
incentives, or a combination of any of the above.
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c. Self-Regulating Organizations
Self-Regulating Organizations (SROs) are one way for the system to respond
quickly to recent developments, independent of political changes in the government.
As they consist of industry participants who have direct knowledge of the risk and
costs of the new issues, they will be able to promulgate more efficient rules without
the expensive oversight and delay of government regulators84. Across the globe, the
allocation of securities regulation responsibility between centralized regulators and
SROs depend on factors such as market history, business culture, legal system, the
concept of public interest, the corporate form, the political system, forces of
internationalization85. Thus, there is no definite answer as to how SROs should be
utilized in securities regulation.
In the case of Thailand, where securities laws have lagged behind and the
government is constantly overthrown, SROs have the potential to take on an
extremely important role. The two main SROs for Thai securities are the Thai Bond
Market Association (ThaiBMA)86 and the Association of Thai Securities Companies
(ASCO)87. Thai BMA monitors the conduct of its bond traders to prevent unfair
trading and establish good market practices. ASCO supervises securities dealers and
brokers in addition to issuing rules subject to the approval of the SEC or SET. Both
SROs may enforce their rules through disciplinary action, including but not limited
to warnings, probations, fines, suspension, and revocation of licenses. These
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associations are also engaged in actively education investors and professionals
regarding market trends, current issues, and ethical conduct. While the two Thai
securities markets SROs have only taken on these self-regulatory roles in the past
decade, they are rapidly gaining traction and expanding their operations.
By allocating more responsibility to these two SROs, the capital markets in
Thailand can take advantage of their specialized expertise and efficiency in
regulation88. The self-regulating role can be further reinforced by allowing SROs to
issue temporary, but binding rules before the SEC promulgates official regulations
on new issues. The SROs should also be given a degree of policing power and
adequate resources to initiate enforcement action. On the other hand, SROs have
been criticized for lacking transparency and creating conflicts of interest89. To
address these concerns, the SROs should be required to provide detailed reports
behind their proposals to both the government agencies and the general public. The
affiliations and personal investments of independent directors and arbitrators should
be scrutinized before they assume their roles and constantly monitored. Finally, the
various regulatory and self-regulating entities will need to coordinate the allocation of
authority so as to prevent jurisdictional overlap and other redundancies.

88

See John Carson, Self-Regulation in Securities Markets, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper (January
2011), available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/3313/WPS5542.pdf
89
Sherree DeCovny, The Future of Self-Regulatory Organizations, CFA Institute Magazine (May/June 2014)

22

V.

Conclusion
Since 1963, capital markets in Thailand have grown rapidly and there have been major
changes to Thai securities laws. The Securities and Exchange Act B.E. 2535 (1992) created the
Thai SEC and established a regulatory framework for securities listing, disclosure, and
enforcement. In recent years, there have been five major amendments to the ’92 Act, responding
to global financial crises and reflecting international best practices. However, Thai regulators
have been faced with various enforcement obstacles while weak corporate governance
exacerbates fraud and other abuses. In addition, securities regulation been slow to respond to
fast-paced market changes and emerging technologies. To add to the struggle, frequent military
coups and administrative shutdowns have further stalled innovation and plans for progress.

To respond to these ongoing problems, this paper presents a three-pronged
approach. First, Thai regulators must utilize new tools for enforcement, such as
monetary penalties, class actions, and civil sanctions. In doing so, clear guidelines must
be established, and the shareholders must be incentivized and educated to make use of
these new remedies. Second, we can address weak corporate governance by empowering
minority shareholders to fulfill their monitoring and balancing roles. This can be done
either through changes to the Public Limited Company Act or having large institutional
investors acquire minority stakes. Lastly, with their efficiency and professional expertise,
self-regulating organizations in the securities market can respond quickly to new changes
while isolated from political instability. Thai regulators should allocate more
responsibility to these organizations while maintaining transparency and avoiding
conflicts of interest.
While securities regulation in Thailand has come a long way since its humble
beginnings, there are still many opportunities for improvement. The three-pronged
approach will address the current challenges faced by Thai regulators and help to ensure
23

investor protection, market efficiency, and prevention of systemic failure. However, the
future remains uncertain for Thai securities markets, as they are faced with a wide range
of international and domestic pressures. As such, the evolution of securities laws in
Thailand is not complete, nor will it ever be. Overall, Thai regulators must constantly
innovate to keep up with the new changes, keeping in mind the unique business culture,
judicial systems, and existing laws of Thailand.
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